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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TRANSIT DISTRICT MAY NOT CONSTITUTION-
ALLY RESTRICT PAID ADVERTISING SO AS To EXCLUDE OPINIONS AND BELIEFS
WITHIN THE AIABIT OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION.- On September 10,
1964, the Berkeley-Oakland Chapter of Women for Peace sought permission
to place a paid anti-war advertisement1 on the motor coaches of the Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit District (hereinafter referred to as the district). The
defendant district refused to accept the advertisement on the ground that its
policy limited paid advertisements to commercial advertising for the sale of
goods and services, political advertising being accepted only in connection with
and at the time of a duly called election within the boundaries of the district.
Plaintiffs, acting as individuals and as representatives of the Berkeley-Oakland
Chapter of Women for Peace, sought an injunction restraining the district from
refusing to accept the advertisement. The trial court, finding that the plaintiffs
were unconstitutionally deprived of their rights of free speech as well as denied
the equal protection of the laws, issued a preliminary injunction. In a divided
opinion, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court's ruling and
held: having opened a forum for the expression of ideas by providing facilities
for advertisements on its buses, a transit district cannot, for reasons of adminis-
trative convenience, decline to accept advertisements expressing opinions and
beliefs within the ambit of first amendment protection. Wirta v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit District, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution2 was adopted in
1791, but it was not until 1939 that the United States Supreme Court declared
that citizens have a right to exercise first amendment guarantees in the streets
and open areas of parks.8 That year, in Hague v. CIO,' the Court noted:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.5
As a result of the Hague decision, streets and public parks clearly furnish a
forum in which first amendment rights may be exercised. Following Hague,
efforts have been made to enlarge this forum to include public buildings and
1 The advertisement read:
"'Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind.'President John F. Kennedy.
Write to President Johnson: 
Negotiate Vietnam.
Women for Peace
P.O. Box 944, Berkeley."
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech ... :" First amendement freedoms are protected from state infringement by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1959);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
3 Gorlick, Right To A Forum, 71 DicK. L. REv. 273 (1967).
4 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
5 Id. at 515.
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other facilities, but numerous cases have clearly held that public buildings need
not be made available for public meetings.6 Thus, it has been said that unless
a forum has been declared to exist, there is no right to a forum.'
Mr. Justice Mosk, writing for the majority in Wirta, felt that the district's
determination to accept advertising on its motor coaches evidenced an opening
of that forum to the public,' and so he effectively avoided considerations ap-
plicable to ascertaining whether public transportation must be made available
as a forum for the exercise of first amendment rights. Once he made that as-
sumption, the case of Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District9 furnished
Justice Mosk with compelling precedent. In that case, a statute required gov-
erning boards of school districts to grant organizations formed for educational,
political, economic, or other stated purposes access to the schools for meetings;
but the privilege was not to be granted to organizations constituting a "sub-
versive element" as that term was broadly defined in the statute. In requiring
the school board to permit the San Diego Civil Liberties Committee to use a
school auditorium, Justice Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme Court,
remarked:
The state is under no duty to make school buildings available for
public meetings. . . . If it elects to do so, however, it cannot arbitrarily
prevent any members of the public from holding such meetings .... Nor
can it make the privilege of holding them dependent on conditions that
would deprive any members of the public of their constitutional rights.
A state is without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a
condition for granting a privilege even though the privilege is the use of
state property." (Citations omitted.)
Justice Mosk felt that the factual situation in Wirta was even more com-
pelling than that in Danskin since
[i]n the instant case, unlike Danskin, the ban is not upon the expres-
sion of ideas by persons or organizations whose convictions or affiliations
are disapproved, but upon all ideas which do not relate to the sale of
products or services or to an election. The prohibition here is painted
with a much broader brush than that used by the school and condemned
in Danskin. There all opinions and beliefs which fell within the protection
of the First Amendment could be aired in the schools, and only their ex-
pression by purportedly subversive elements was barred, whereas here the
6 Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963) (dictum), aff'd per curiam, 375
U.S. 395 (1964); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545, 171
P.2d 885, 891 (1946) (dictum); Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist., 364 Ill. 90, 107, 4 N.E.2d
1, 9 (1936); Ellis v. Allen, 4 App. Div. 2d 343, 344, 165 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (1957) (dictum);
Hooker v. Conte, 208 Misc. 188, 193, 143 N.Y.S.2d 750, 755-56 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See also
the statement of Mr. Justice Black in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 166 (1966) (dissenting
opinion) : Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly and the right of
petition along with the rights of speech, press, and religion, it does not guarantee
to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by govern-
ment and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.
7 Gorlick, supra note 3, at 274.
8 Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
433 '(1967).
9 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
10 Id. at 545-46, 171 P.2d at 891.
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ban is directly related to the content of the ideas sought to be published.
. . . The vice is not that the district has preferred one point of view over
another, but that it chooses between classes of ideas entitled to consti-
tutional protection .... Thus the district's regulation exercises a most
pervasive form of censorship."
To Justice Mosk, the district was not only attempting to regulate the content
of the advertisements, but it was doing so in a way that afforded total freedom of
the forum to mercantile messages while banning the vast majority of opinions
and beliefs protected by the first amendment precisely because of their non-
commercial content."2 By so doing, the district's policy necessarily disregarded
a long line of Supreme Court decisions enshrining noncommercial messages while
expressly stating that commercial messages do not come within the orbit of the
first amendment and may therefore be regulated or prohibited by government
in the same manner as other business affairs. 3
After proposing a number of hypothetical situations to illustrate the para-
doxical scope of the district's policy,'4 Justice Mosk went on to analogize the
regulation in the principal case to that involved in the recent Supreme Court
decision of Cox v. Louisiana.5 There a state statute prohibited the obstruction
of public passageways, but permitted picketing by labor organizations for legal
objectives. Appellant was convicted for leading a sidewalk meeting to protest
racial segregation, but the Supreme Court reversed his conviction on the ground
that the statute improperly permitted local officials to exercise unfettered discre-
tion in regulating the use of the streets.' In a concurring opinion, Justice Black
stated:
[BJy specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union
views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is
willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law
what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its
streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a
most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.17
Relying on Justice Black's statement, Justice Mosk stated: "In creating an iron
11 Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
434 (1967).
12 Id.
13 Thus, a city may ban commercial advertising in the form of handbills, Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); but it may not prohibit the public distribution of all
handbills including those expressing religious beliefs, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
door-to-door solicitation for the sale of magazine subscriptions may be banned, Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); but a distributor of notices for a religious meeting may
not be barred from soliciting homeowners by an ordinance against the ringing of doorbells to
distribute advertisements, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
14 E.g., A cigarette company could advertise, but a cancer society could not warn of
the injurious effects of cigarette smoking; an oil refinery may advertise, but a citizens' organiza-
tion may not demand enforcement of existing air pollution statutes; advertisements for travel,
food, clothing, toiletries, and automobiles are acceptable, but the American Legion could
not place a paid advertisement reading, "Support Our Boys in Viet Nam. Send Holiday
Packages." Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 986-87, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 430, 434-35 (1967).
15 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
16 Id. at 558.
17 Id. at 581 '(concurring opinion).
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curtain barring expression of all ideas not related to an election or to the sale
of goods or services, the regulation is comparable to the statute in Cox... which
banned issues unrelated to labor unions.""8
Justice Mosk ultimately faced the district's primary contention that the
basic issue in Wirta was not the right of free speech, but the right to equal pro-
tection of the laws. 9 By making such a contention, the district was apparently
attempting to convince the court of the general reasonableness of its classifica-
tion." However, Justice Mosk not only dismissed any societal interest, other than
free speech, which might be present as "too obscure or trivial to be readily ap-
parent,"'" but he went on to say that "Danskin ... and numerous other cases
have recognized that the general reasonableness test applicable to the due process
and equal protection clauses is not to be utilized where First Amendment rights
are at stake."22 Indeed, the reasonableness test has generally been applied in
considering the constitutionality of ordinances dealing with the time, place, and
manner of expression," rather than the content of expression.'
In searching for the test to apply to the factual situation in Wirta, Justice
Mosk relied heavily on the case of Weaver v. Jordan" where a statute prohibiting
pay television in the home was struck down by the California Supreme Court
as an abridgement of free speech. The court noted:
When a restriction of a First Amendment freedom is of such unlimited
potential scope it may be imposed only to avoid a "clear and present
danger" that a substantive evil will otherwise result which the state has
a right to prevent. The weighing of interests [the reasonableness test]
which the courts have at times found necessary or appropriate when con-
sidering a restriction more narrow in language or in application may be
dispensed with if . . . the enactment is so broad as to impose a complete
ban of expression and communication through a specified medium.
2
(Emphasis added.)
Applying the Weaver test, Justice Mosk concluded that the district's policy almost
completely banned noncommercial expression through the medium of advertis-
18 Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 987, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
435 (1967).
19 Id. at 988, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
20 The district attempted to justify its policy on the following grounds: (1) the acceptance
of advertising unrelated to an election or the sale of goods and services might give the im-
pression that the district endorses the views of the advertiser; (2) the district would be
required to accept all messages submitted to it; (3) the district would have to contact
opposing groups and make space available for expression of their views. Id. at 989, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 437.
21 Id. at 988, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
22 Id. For Supreme Court support for this idea, see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
23 M. SHAPIRo, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME 'COURT AND JUDICAL REvmw 78
(1966). See also Frantz, The First Amendment In the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1429
(1962).
24 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
25 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966).
26 Id. at 295, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
Uune, 1968]
CASE COMMENTS
ing on motor coaches without asserting the existence of any clear and present
danger."
Justice Burke, dissenting in Wirta, relied solely on logic without a single
resort to precedent. His basic contention was that the majority was operating
under an invalid assumption, i.e., that the announced policy of the district con-
stituted an opening of a forum for the expression of ideas.2" He felt that what
was involved instead was a managerial judgment to augment revenues by selling
advertising space, and such policy determinations are lodged by the California
legislature exclusively within the purview of the board of directors of the district.29
Furthermore, from the fact that commercial messages do not come within the
orbit of the first amendment, Justice Burke reached the dubious conclusion that,
as to the use of bus advertising space for commercial purposes, the board in no
way transgressed upon the plaintiffs' first amendment rights."0
The existence of a forum was undoubtedly of crucial importance to the
holding in Wirta.3' Logically, the majority's position is unimpeachable since "the
determination of the district to accept advertising on its motor coaches serves
as its considered conclusion that this form of communication will not interfere
with its primary function of providing transportation."32 Even though such
a determination does constitute a managerial judgment, it also constitutes an
opening of a forum to the expression of first amendment rights.3 3 However,
precedent does not always follow logic in the area of first amendment rights. In
State ex rel. Greisinger v. Grand Rapids Board of Education,"' the Ohio Court
of Appeals refused to order the defendant to permit Jehovah's Witnesses to use a
school auditorium, even though the auditorium was available to other organiza-
tions for educational, religious, civic, social, and recreational meetings.3 In
referring to the statutory provisions authorizing defendant's conduct, the Ohio
court stated: "The purposes and intent of the Legislature to confer on the Board
discretionary power could hardly be expressed with greater clarity or in a more
appropriate area of our free society." '36 Fundamental to such a statement is a
philosophical commitment that courts should not interfere with the discretionary
power lodged in administrative bodies by the legislature.3 7 This may be desirous
in some instances, but as the holding in Greisinger and the dissent in Wirta il-
lustrate, such a philosophy can lead to the conclusion that forums for the ex-
pression of ideas may be opened on a limited basis without regard to first amend-
ment freedoms.
The reliance by the Wirta majority on the "clear and present danger" test
27 Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 988, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
436 (1967).
28 Id. at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (dissenting opinion).
29 Id. at 991-92, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 439-40 (dissenting opinion).
30 Id. at 991, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 439 '(dissenting opinion).
31 See text accompanying notes 6 and 7 supra.
32 Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
433 (1967).
33 It is interesting to note that neither of the parties in Wirta questioned this basic assump-
tion made by the majority. Id.
34 88 Ohio App. 364, 100 N.E.2d 294 (1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
35 Id. at 370, 100 N.E.2d at 298.
36 Id. at 371, 100 N.E.2d at 299.
37 See generally Gorlick, supra note 3, at 279.
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is also noteworthy. This time-honored phrase was first used by Justice Holmes
in Schenck v. United States8 and since its inception has undergone considerable
discussion and refinement."9 The test should not be mechanically applied in
every case touching first amendment freedoms,40 and in fact under prevailing
authority, its application appears limited to situations involving restrictions upon
the content of speech."1 By interpreting the district's policy as a regulation of
content,42 the Wirta majority was therefore justified in applying the test.
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority," a recent decision by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, supports the Wirta court's use of.
the clear and present danger test. In Kissinger, a student group sought a
declaratory judgment that the city transit authority be required to accept anti-
Vietnam posters for display in New York subway stations. Although the motion
was denied because defendants' contention that the posters would seriously en-
danger safety in the subways raised questions of fact," the court did state that
"[a]bsent a showing that the posters would present a 'clear and present' danger
... the guarantee of freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments extends to plaintiffs' posters."4 5 As the Supreme Court stated in Termi-
niello v. Chicago,"
a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a con-
dition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may
strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects
as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech,
though not absolute . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest.... There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.47
George L. Burgett
ANTITRUST LAw - SHERMAN ACT - INTER-DIviSIONAL CONSPIRACY -
UNINCORPORATED DIMsIONs OF A SINGLE CORPORATION ARE LEGALLY CAPABLE
OF CONSPIRING AMONG THEMSELVES IN VIOLATION OF SECTION I OF THE
SHERMAN ACT- Until 1965, Hawaiian Oke & Liquors was a wholesale liquor
38 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
39 For an excellent analysis of the development of the test, see M. SHAPIRo, supra note
23, at 46-75.
40 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
41 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Weaver v. Jordan, 411
P.2d 289, 301, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 549 (dissenting opinion).
42 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
43 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
44 Id. at 443.
45 Id. at 442.
46 337 U.S. 1 '(1949).
47 Id. at 4-5.
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distributor in Hawaii of products supplied by Calvert Distillers Company, Four
Roses Distillers Company, Frankfort Distillers Company, and Barton Western
Distilling Company. Calvert, Four Roses, and Frankfort were unincorporated
divisions of House of Seagram which in turn was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. Barton Western was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Barton Distilling Company. Calvert, Four Roses, and Frankfort had one-
year distributorship contracts with Hawaiian Oke which by their terms expired
on July 31, 1965. On June 25, 1965, Calvert notified Hawaiian Oke that it
would not renew its contract. A few days later, Four Roses and Frankfort sent
Hawaiian Oke separate notices to the same effect. On July 6, 1965, Barton
Western notified Hawaiian Oke that it had decided to terminate its oral working
arrangement with Hawaiian Oke. Calvert, Four Roses, Frankfort, and Barton
Western had each decided to distribute its products in Hawaii through McKes-
son & Robbins, a national wholesale distributor of drugs and liquors.
Thereafter, Hawaiian Oke brought suit in federal district court under section
4 of the Clayton Act1 to recover treble damages for injury to its wholesale liquor
distribution business allegedy resulting from violations of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act2 by Joseph Seagram, House of Seagram, Barton, Barton Western, and
McKesson. The court instructed the jury to treat the Calvert, Four Roses, and
Frankfort divisions of House of Seagram as separate entities for the purpose of
determining whether or not they had combined or conspired, within the meaning
of the Sherman Act, to terminate Hawaiian Oke as their distributor. The jury
found a conspiracy and returned a verdict of $65,000 against all defendants.'
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii then entered a
final judgment of $246,938 including treble damages, interest, costs, and attor-
neys' fees4 and held: unincorporated divisions of a corporation are legally capable
of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act; and the business
activity related to the alleged conspiracy is the only business activity that must
be considered in determining each division's status as a separate legal entity
capable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Hawaiian
Oke & Liquors, Limited v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, 272 F. Supp. 915
(D. Hawaii 1967).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal.... ."I Section 1 was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in Standard
Oil Company v. United States,6 where the Court dismembered the Standard
Oil petroleum combine. In construing the Sherman Act, Chief Justice White
reviewed the legal history of the language employed by Congress and concluded:
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1(1964).
3 Opening Joint Brief on Behalf of Appellants at 9, Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, No. 22162 (9th Cir.).
4 Id. The district court held that the divisions were to be considered as being the
corporation for purposes of returning a verdict and entering final judgment. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F. Supp. 915, 917 (D. Hawaii 1967).
5 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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That in view of the many new forms of contracts and combinations
which were being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed
essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of
contract or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign
commerce was brought about could save such restraint from condemna-
tion....
[The enumerated classes of acts are] broad enough to embrace every
conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning
trade or commerce or the subjects of such commerce .... [T]he standard
of reason . . . was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not
brought about the wrong against which the statute provided. 7
From the broad language used both by Congress in the Sherman Act itself
and by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil flowed an endless stream of litiga-
tion involving charges that a wide variety of contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies were in restraint of trade. Depending on the circumstances of each
case, these contracts, combinations, and conspiracies may be classified as either
inter-corporate, intra-enterprise, intra-corporate, or inter-divisional.
An inter-corporate contract, combination, or conspiracy is one between
separate corporations. A conspiracy between independent corporations is truly
an inter-corporate conspiracy.' A conspiracy between a subsidiary corporation
and its parent corporation 9 and a conspiracy between two subsidiary corpora-
tions of the same parent ° are both technically inter-corporate conspiracies since
two separate corporations are involved in each conspiracy. However, parent
and subsidiary corporations are not actually independent since they are parts
of the same enterprise. Therefore, parent-subsidiary and subsidiary-subsidiary
conspiracies are more accurately classified as intra-enterprise conspiracies."
In contrast to inter-corporate conspiracies are intra-corporate conspiracies,
which involve only one corporation. A conspiracy between a corporation and
its officers acting in its behalf'2 or a conspiracy among the employees of a cor-
poration acting in its behalf'" or a conspiracy between a corporation and its
unincorporated division 4 is an intra-corporate conspiracy. A conspiracy between
two unincorporated divisions of a corporation is also an intra-corporate con-
spiracy since it involves only one corporation. However, this latter type of con-
spiracy more closely resembles an intra-enterprise conspiracy between subsidiary
corporations of the same parent than it does the other types of intra-corporate
7 Id. at 59-60.
8 E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
9 E.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
10 E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
11 See generally Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
35 Miss. L.J. 5 (1963). For citations to earlier treatments of the subject, see id. at 5 n.3.
12 E.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (no violation of § I of the Sherman Act). Cf. Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) (no conspiracy between a corporation and the
individual who was its sole shareholder). See also Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amuse-
ment Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1950) (no conspiracy between two corporations whose
stock was owned jointly by a husband and wife).
13 E.g., South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ili. 1965) (no
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
14 E.g., Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex.
1960) (no violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
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conspiracy and is therefore more accurately classified as an inter-divisional
conspiracy.
15
Typical of many antitrust cases," Hawaiian Oke contained alleged con-
spiracies of various types. For instance, Joseph Seagram and Barton were inde-
pendent corporations, and therefore, the alleged conspiracy between them was
inter-corporate." Since House of Segram was a subsidiary of Joseph Seagram,
the alleged conspiracy between them was intra-enterprise. 8  Calvert was an
unincorporated division of House of Seagram; hence, the alleged conspiracy
between them was intra-corporate. 9 And finally, since Calvert, Four Roses,
and Frankfort were unincorporated divisions of House of Seagram, the alleged
conspiracy among the divisions themselves was inter-divisional."
Although many previous cases under the Sherman Act had dealt with
inter-corporate, intra-enterprise, and intra-corporate conspiracies,2 Hawaiian
Oke was the first case to deal with "an alleged horizontal conspiracy among the
unincorporated divisions of a single corporation."2 2 Before analyzing this inter-
divisional conspiracy issue, the district court in Hawaiian Oke considered the
general aims and purposes of the antitrust laws. After briefly quoting from the
Sherman Act and Standard Oil, the district court concluded: "The judiciary
is entrusted with protection of the broad public policy favoring competition,
and 'every' act, whether its form be new or old, which unduly interferes with
the interstate flow of commerce is proscribed."2
House of Seagram contended that as a matter of law "a corporation cannot
conspire with itself through its unincorporated divisions." 24 The district court,
however, held that a division could be considered a separate legal entity capable
of conspiring if it had independence of action in the specific business activity
related to the alleged conspiracy. Since Hawaiian Oke alleged a conspiracy to
terminate it as House of Seagram's sales representative in Hawaii, the district
court concluded:
The distribution of defendant's products is the only business function which
is relevant herein. The fact that the Seagram divisions may have certain
joint or common functions does not detract from the admittedly divided
responsibility for marketing. Plaintiff's allegations related to defendant's
sales organizations. This is the only activity which must be considered in
determining each division's status as a separate legal entity capable of
conspiring.... The court finds that Four Roses, Frankfort and Calvert
15 The district court in Hawaiian Oke did not use the term "inter-divisional."
16 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
17 House of Seagram and Barton Western were subsidiaries of different independent
parents, therefore, the alleged conspiracy between them was also inter-corporate.
18 The alleged conspiracy between Barton Western and Barton was similarly intra-
enterprise.
19 The alleged conspiracies between House of Seagram and Four Roses, and between
House of Seagram and Calvert were also intra-corporate.
20 The alleged conspiracy between any two of the divisions was likewise inter-divisional.
21 See cases cited notes 8-10, 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
22 Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F. Supp. 915, 917
(D. Hawaii 1967).
23 Id. at 917-18.
24 Id. at 918.
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are each distinct and separate, operating, marketing entities, legally and
factually capable of entering into the conspiracy alleged.2 5
The primary case relied upon by House of Seagram was Nelson Radio &
Supply Company v. Motorola, Incorporated.' In that case, the alleged con-
spirators were a corporation and its officers, employees, representatives, and
agents. As the district court in Hawaiian Oke noted, Nelson contained "no
allegation that either a corporate subsidiary or division participated."27 Nelson
did, however, contain the following language which House of Seagram believed
supported its position.
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself
any more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the
acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation.2"
Three of the other decisions, Johnny Maddox Motor Company v. Ford
Motor Company,29 Deterjet Corporation v. United Aircraft Corporation, (Ham-
ilton Standard Division),"0 and Kemwel Automotive Corporation v. Ford Motor
Company, 1 advanced by House of Seagram as authority for its position in-
volved alleged conspiracies between corporations and their unincorporated
divisions. In each case the respective district courts, after stating that the de-
fendant corporation was charged with conspiring with one of its divisions, quoted
or restated the principle enunciated in Nelson and concluded that there could
be no such conspiracy."2
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Incorporated33 gave the corporation-division
conspiracy theory a somewhat fuller treatment.
The purpose of Section 1 is to prohibit joint action of two or more persons
in combining their economic power and restricting competition. Poller's
charge that CBS conspired with one of its unincorporated divisions and
two of its employees is obviously unsound. It is in reality a charge that
CBS conspired with itself. As the Fifth Circuit said in [Nelson] ....
We conclude that CBS, its unincorporated division, and its employees
were incapable of conspiring to restrain trade or commerce. 4
However, Judge Washington, dissenting in Poller, stated:
25 Id. at 924.
26 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 '(1953).
27 Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F. Supp. 915, 918
(D. Hawaii 1967).
28 Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
29 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960).
30 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962).
31 1966 Trade Cases 71,882, at 83,095 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
32 Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F.2d 103, 105 (W.D. Tex. 1960);
Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp. (Hamilton Standard Division), 211 F. Supp. 348, 353-54
(D. Del. 1962)1 Kemwel Automotive Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 1966 Trade Cases 1 71,882,
at 83,095 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
33 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
34 Id. at 603.
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In my view, CBS could conspire with CBS-TV, a wholly-owned, but not
incorporated, "division" -as separate and distinct an organization as a
wholly-owned subsidiary. Since there were other [outside] alleged co-
conspirators, it is unnecessary, however, to rely on that ground.3 5
On appeal to the Supreme Court, CBS contended that "CBS-TV was not a
separate entity but only a division of CBS, and therefore there could be no
conspiracy between the two . . . ."" However, the Supreme Court reserved
that issue: "We do not pass upon the point urged by Poller that under the
CBS corporate arrangement of divisions, with separate officers and autonomy
in each, the divisions came within the rule as to corporate subsidiaries."3 In-
stead, the Court reversed and remanded on the ground that summary judgment
was not in order since there was a genuine issue as to the material facts. Poller
had also alleged that CBS conspired with independent parties.
In reply to the position taken by House of Seagram, the district court in
Hawaiian Oke stated its belief that "the broad principle of law taken from
Nelson, and applied unswervingly in Poller, Deterjet, Kemwel, and Johnny
Maddox""5 was not controlling in the factual situation before the court, since
[e]ven as enunciated in Nelson, the principle that a corporation cannot
conspire with itself does not preclude divisions from being legally capable
of conspiring. As quoted above, "you must have two ... entities to have
a conspiracy." The interpretation given this concept to date, when related
to divisions, is that a corporation and an unincorporated division thereof
are but one entity in a court of law. 9
The court then distinguished these prior cases on the ground that they involved
alleged vertical corporation-division conspiracies in contrast to the horizontal
inter-divisional conspiracy among Calvert, Four Roses, and Frankfort alleged
by Hawaiian Oke.
In addition, the district court made a more basic objection when it asserted
that the Fifth Circuit in Nelson had mechanically applied the historical legal
concept of a corporation as a "person."
But are all corporations, in fact, "persons," each with one brain, one
nerve center, at which all decisions are reached? It is well settled that in
corporate structures which consist of a parent corporation and incorporated
subsidiaries, each entity is capable of conspiring. . . .The question, then,
is what, if any, magic occurs when the paper partition is removed. Is a
business group which chooses to organize as a single corporation with un-
incorporated divisions automatically cast in the form of a normal person?
Or may we have a corporate "person" in the form of a multiheaded Siva,
or as portrayed by Dali or Artzybasheff?
Thus, whether a division is capable of conspiring depends on the
peculiar facts demonstrated.40
35 Id. at 607 (dissenting opinion).
36 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 468 (1962).
37 Id. at 469 n.4.
38 Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F. Supp. 915, 918
(D. Hawaii 1967).
39 Id. at 918-19.
40 Id. at 919-20.
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In support of its statement that a parent corporation and its incorporated
subsidiaries are capable of conspiring, the court cited two of the leading cases4'
involving an intra-enterprise conspiracy. In United States v. Yellow Cab Com-
pany, 2 the Supreme Court found a conspiracy among a corporation and its
subsidiaries. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that section
1 of the Sherman Act does not apply to a vertically integrated enterprise. The
Court stated that the "corporate interrelationships of the conspirators... are not
determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed
at substance rather than form." 3 The other leading case, Kiefer-Stewart Com-
pany v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,44 involved a horizontal conspiracy between
subsidiary corporations. Citing Yellow Cab, the Supreme Court in Kiefer-
Stewart rejected the contention that the Seagram and Calvert subsidiary cor-
porations were not capable of conspiring in a manner forbidden by the Sherman
Act because they were "'mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-mer-
chandising unit' . . . ."" The Court noted that the rule enunciated in Yellow
Cab that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from
the impact of the antitrust laws is "especially applicable where, as here, respon-
dents [Calvert and Seagram] hold themselves out as competitors." 8
Less than two years after the Kiefer-Stewart decision, the Federal Trade
Commission charged the Seagram enterprise corporations with violating the
Federal Trade Commission Act.47 That suit was disposed of on March 2, 1954,
by a consent settlement requiring a compliance report.4 Prior to July 31, 1954,
Joseph Seagram had distributed its alcoholic beverages in the United States
through a group of wholly-owned subsidiaries. At that time, the Seagram enter-
prise underwent a corporate reorganization, with each of the domestic sales
subsidiaries becoming divisions of a newly formed corporation known as the
House of Seagram. Commenting on what it called the "organizational jug-
gling"49 of the Seagram enterprise, the district court in Hawaiian Oke stated
that "there was no substantive change in the marketing technique employed.
There is nothing wrong with reorganizing to comply with court rulings. How-
41 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 '(1947). The court in Hawaiian Oke also cited
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) which has been described
as "too unique to be cited in this context." 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRADaMARKS AND MONOPOLI-S 351 n.92 '(3d ed. 1967).
42 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
43 Id. at 227.
44 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
45 Id. at 215.
46 Id.
47 In re Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd., 50 F.T.C. 738 (1954). A similar charge was
made against Schenley on the same date. In re Schenley Indus., 50 F.T.C. 747 (1954).
48 In re Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd., 50 F.T.C. 738, 745-46 (1954). Noting that
under the compliance reports the corporate sales subsidiaries were changed to divisions, one
commentator characterized that type of antitrust enforcement as an "obsession with legal form
devoid of any substantive connotations." Warnke, Symposium-Antitrust Limits on Distribu-
tion Policies and Programs-Relationship of Antitrust to Conventional Legal Categories, 26
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 144, 153 '(1964).




ever, to avoid the judicial proscription the' reorganization must be more than a
shuffling of papers.""0
The relationship between the various divisions and corporations in the
reorganized Seagram enterprise was described by several Seagram officers. After
setting forth portions of those descriptions, the court stated: "If these auton-
omous divisions deviated from their normal procedure, so that separate, decision-
making 'heads' acted in concert [in terminating Hawaiian Oke], they became
subject to the proscriptions of the antitrust laws."5 ,
Although the district court in Hawaiian Oke based its inter-divisional
conspiracy holding on broad principles of antitrust law drawn from the Sherman
Act and Standard Oil, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was relied upon
as specific support. The court stated: "It is well settled that in corporate struc-
tures which consist of a parent corporation and incorporated subsidiaries, each
entity is capable of conspiring."52 In 1955, however, a minority of the members
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
rejected the intra-enterprise conspiracy theory. They felt that in no instance
could a parent corporation and its subsidiary be held guilty of violating section
1 of the Sherman Act. Their belief was based on a statement made by Justice
Jackson, dissenting in Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States,"" that
counsel, in arguing that case for the United States, had conceded that if Timken
had, within its own corporate organization, set up separate departments, "'that
would not be a conspiracy. You must have two entities to have a conspiracy.' "
Therefore, these members of the Committee thought it to be wholly unjust to
impose liability where a company employed subsidiaries instead of branches,
departments, or divisions. In contrast, a majority of the members of the Com-
mittee agreed that under Timken, Yellow Cab, and Kiefer-Stewart, an intra-
enterprise conspiracy unreasonably restraining the trade of strangers violates
section 1 of the Sherman Act, but a conspiracy that restrains no trade other
than that of the parent and its subsidiaries is not prohibited by section 1.5" In
other words, most members accepted the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Their requirement of an unreasonable restraint on the trade of strangers merely
acknowledged that the Standard Oil "rule of reason"5 " in antitrust cases also
applies to intra-enterprise conspiracies.
One commentator has stated that application of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine has such grotesque implications that it could end the use of
50 Id. at 921.
51 Id. at 923.
52 Id. at 919.
53 ATT-y GEN. NAT'L COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 35 (1955).
54 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
55 Id. at 606 (dissenting opinion).
56 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. To STUDY TiE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 53, at 34-35.
The use of subsidiaries is generally induced by normal, prudent business con-
siderations. No social objective would be attained were subsidiaries enjoined from
agreeing not to compete with each other or with their parent. To demand internal
competition within and between the members of a single business unit is to invite
chaos without promotion of the public welfare. Id. at 34.
57 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 '(1911). The "rule of reason" was




subsidiary corporations in American business and industry.8 This author stated
unequivocally that there is no place for the doctrine of intra-enterprise con-
spiracy within the present Sherman Act."' Another writer, conceding that there
is some support for the strange doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy, asserted
that no court had flatly decided that there could be such a conspiracy although
there is language in several cases to that effect." This latter commentator re-
garded as "unfortunate"'" the implication in Justice Clark's statement in Poller
that "[w]e do not pass upon the point urged by Poller that under the CBS
corporate arrangement of divisions . . . the divisions came within the rule as
to corporate subsidiaries," 62 and he urged that the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine be rejected in its entirety.
A parent corporation must control and coordinate the activities of its sub-
sidiaries. Finding a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because of
a conspiracy solely between a parent and its subsidiaries, or between sub-
sidiaries, is like condemning the bi-sexual oyster for incest. Neither the
oyster nor a corporate family should be condemned for something it can-
not avoid.
6 3
The primary reason why most commentators criticize or reject the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine is because subsidiary corporations are held to
violate the Sherman Act for doing what unincorporated divisions could do
legally. 4 Admitting that it would be absurd to take the position that the same
type of conduct is reasonable in one case and unreasonable in the other, one
commentator, instead of rejecting the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,
favored applying the rationale of that doctrine to inter-divisional conspiracies. 5
This writer advocated reaching the same result whether an enterprise operates
as a simple corporation, as a corporate family, or as a corporation with divisions.
He submitted that "the permissible course of conduct for any corporation should
be determined by an evaluation of the nature of the undertaking itself, rather
than by an attempt to erect technical and artificial barriers in an effort to furnish
58 McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section I of the Sherman Act,
41 VA. L. REV. 183, 188 (1955).
59 Id. at 216.
60 Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section I of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss.
L.J. 5, 9-10 (1963) Professor Stengel's article is a comprehensive attempt to explain the
language and holdings in Yellow Cab, Kiefer-Stewart, Timken, Poller, and the lower court
cases involving intra-corporate and intra-enterprise conspiracies. See also McQuade, supra note
58, at 188-214.
61 Stengel, supra note 60, at 26.
62 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 469 n.4 (1962).
63 Stengel, supra note 60, at 27.
64 See, e.g., Warnke, supra note 48, at 155.
[I]f the courts are to find antitrust violation when two subsidiaries of a single
enterprise do what two divisions could do without raising any legal question, the
resulting situation is a bit like Professor Higgins' complaint in "My Fair Lady":
"The French don't care what they do as long as they pronounce it correctly." Id.
House of Seagram has suggested in its appellate court brief that there is no validity to the
inter-divisional conspiracy doctrine since it can be easily circumvented by having all the
corporation's products handled by the same salesmen. Opening Joint Brief on Behalf of
Appellants at 20, Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, No. 22162
(9th Cir.).
65 Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-EnterPrise Conspiracy, 23 MONT.
L. REV. 158, 198 (1962).
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immunity."66 Such reasoning reached fruition in the decision in Hawaiian Oke. "
The inter-divisional conspiracy doctrine formulated by the district court
in Hawaiian Oke eliminates a loophole in the application of the antitrust laws.
An enterprise, like Seagrams, which is "'pretty well designed along the General
Motors setup' "" should not enjoy an automatic immunity from section 1 of
the Sherman Act. That section proscribes every conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Therefore it proscribes not only inter-corporate conspiracies, but inter-divisional
conspiracies as well. As the Hawaiian Oke court pointed out, "[t]here is noth-
ing sacrosanct about the 'unincorporated' aspect of corporate divisions. To hold
otherwise would give businessmen the power to avoid the proscriptions of the
antitrust laws by the fortuitous employment of alert legal counsel."69 The cor-
porations potentially affected by the inter-divisional conspiracy doctrine lose an
easy, but unfair, defense to an alleged violation of section 1. All is not lost,
however, because corporations with divisions retain the defenses available to
other alleged violators, namely, no actual conspiracy and no unreasonable re-
straint of trade. Equality of treatment under section 1 of the Sherman Act
should be and is restored by the decision in Hawaiian Oke.
William J. Hassing
66 Id. at 199.
67 Although the court in Hawaiian Oke did not cite Barndt's article, it did state that
corporations could "not evade the applicable law merely by changing the label attached to a
particular business entity." Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
272 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Hawaii 1967).
68 Id. at 922 (deposition of Joseph Seagram's executive vice-president). The president
of Joseph Seagram stated that the Seagram enterprise had a "General Motors type
concept. .. ." Id. at 921.
69 Id. at 920.
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